Just a few weeks ago, the biggest threat to the U.S. government’s computer systems seemed to be hostile foreign powers could break into them and steal data. In late December, Treasury officials sent a letter to members of Congress reporting that a Chinese group had hacked into their system and stole unclassified documents. The department said it is working with the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and the FBI to assess the losses.
But in recent days, a more pressing threat has emerged, one of which is homegrown: billionaire tech entrepreneur Elon Musk and his team of engineers from the so-called government efficiency ministry claim that it can be widely used Access to sensitive systems, which can process sensitive systems and classify information in several government agencies. Perhaps through design, the scope and details of Musk's action are difficult to determine. At a hearing before a federal judge this week, Trump administration lawyers insisted that Musk did not personally access sensitive Treasury data and agreed that "special government employees" related to Doge will "read only" information , and will not be shared with others who work with Doge.
But even if the legality of Duoqi's moves is shelved, some of which appear to be illegal and unconstitutional, the dangerous privacy risks are also dangerous privacy risks caused by violating sensitive data, and there is another reason for alarm: Musk The activities have brought about a national security nightmare. Consider how intelligence agencies of U.S. allies and rivals see when the U.S. president has fully allocated funds to make the U.S. government campaign for a team of young people without government experience who may not pass the standard staff to conduct the review process, and who has a wide range of individuals in national security spending Unelected persons working for financial interests.
American opponents will surely see spies and blackmailed Monopoly. Not very obvious, but crucially, American allies are accustomed to sharing information with the United States every day and may also carefully study their typical routines. Will they be willing to continue operating as usual? Even if Musk hasn't entered the system of major national security agencies, it's very likely that he might do so now, and foreign governments, friends and enemies will certainly be watching closely.
The presumption of thresholds is to identify and eliminate wasteful expenditures. It is certain that elements of the federal bureaucracy will benefit from the reform. No one denies the administration's waste, fraud and abuse. It is normal for most federal employees who have traditionally accessed these systems. What is abnormal is the person who is going to grant such access, those who review government employees, untrained government employees and take instructions from people like Musk, who have no legal authorization to make a decision with the federal budget and federal personnel and there are huge potential conflicts of interest.
Although the union representing federal workers has raised legal challenges and visits to Musk's decision-making powers, and 13 state attorneys generals have announced their intention to raise these issues, the court case will take time to resolve; at the same time, It will have caused damage to safety. Institutional trust and institutional trust and clarity about who can access sensitive information and authority within the institution is crucial to U.S. security. By undermining the system designed to maintain the public, the Trump administration not only greatly reduces the opportunity for real reform, but also puts the country at risk. Trump and Musk's moves are equivalent to throwing grenades into the center of national security agencies. Eventually, the grenades will be extinguished and the United States will have nowhere to dive.
A good foreign policy is invisible, it is routine, boring, and full of daily interactions that few people notice, but it is crucial to prevent adverse outcomes and mitigate what does happen. Allies and partners share intelligence, consultation and plans; during times of crisis, the United States can ask them for help. The basis of this system is trust. Among the country’s friends and allies, this trust is the highest – Trump’s tariff threats and other types of bullying have weakened willingness to work with the United States. But even the relationship with the opponent has a certain level of trust, and the relationship between the United States and the confrontation is regularly communicated through official and informal channels to avoid dangerous miscalculation and misunderstandings.
Musk's recent move targets two pillars of the foundation. First is what political scientists Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman call the "pipeline" of the international system. The key part of the pipeline is the system that Musk and his team accessed, which contains highly sensitive information, including personal data from any American who receives payments from the U.S. government, such as Social Security, tax refunds, and benefits for veterans. According to the report wiredin addition to members of the Musk team who access only reading to these systems, an engineer working at Musk also has “many administrator-level privileges” and “not only readable capabilities, but also readable code” financial services. (The engineer resigned on February 6 this Wall Street Journal Linking him to a now-deleted account X that contains racist positions, but damage to security systems and their confidence may have been done. )
For example, the Ministry of Finance itself is an important foreign policy actor, such as playing an important role in sanctions policy. If Musk’s team can use and rewrite the code that indicates payments from the U.S. government, then cybersecurity and privacy risks will be enormous. Hostile intelligence services may already be working, trying to assess which Musk team members may be with their digital devices or people who are prone to entanglement or coercion. Treasury officials may be concerned that untested code could cause the payment system to crash.
Musk's Doge employees also require access to confidential systems they do not have authorization. According to Bloomberg News, members of the Governor’s team appeared at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) on January 27, and the Trump administration appears to be able to remove it as an independent government agency without consulting Congress. On February 1, Doge employees requested access to USAID’s Sensitive Closing Information Facility (SCIF), a secure room used by the entire administration to handle confidential information. After being stopped by a security official, "a threshold employee called Musk and Musk informed the agency's security officials that he would be involved in U.S. Marshals' services if his team could not get even sensitive information." this guardianSecurity officials were shortly after "taking administrative leave, Governor's staff entered the SCIF".
Musk's activities showcase the nightmare of national security.
Sharing and protecting secrets is an important part of international cooperation between the United States and its closest allies: countries need to believe that sensitive information will be seen as such. As political scientists Allison Carnegie and Austin Carson prove, “effective confidentiality systems” are crucial to international cooperation because states are concerned about their intelligence gathering, Including sources and methods will fall into the wrong hands, making it more difficult to collect intellectual futures.
It is not clear why Musk wants to visit SCIF at the U.S. Agency for International Development. However, confidential information is divided within the government for some reason to limit the number of people who really need to understand and maintain the risk of unintentional or malicious disclosure. Even if Musk’s team doesn’t develop further, Doge’s threat could try anything that would undermine the government’s secrecy system, which would erode the confidence of our allies who can share sensitive intelligence information with the United States.
The second pillar of the trust is based on people working in institutions. To be sure, during normal times, many people in the Treasury had no idea of access to the payment system and all the sensitive personal data Musk could see now. But these are professions, non-political bureaucrats serving both presidents, whose job is to execute payments, not to decide who gets what. They conduct reviews, are required to announce and resolve any potential conflicts of interest, and once appropriate permission is given (if through) the system is trained.
It is not clear how members of the Governor’s team complete these processes thoroughly. On his first day of office, Trump issued an order that enables individuals to obtain temporary senior licenses and “immediate access to the facilities and technology necessary for the responsibilities of the employed office.” February 3, The New York Times According to the report, “According to the familiar situation, two people said: “Muk’s allies were granted the payment system, passed the government background check, passed the government background check and obtained the necessary security clearance. "However, it usually takes months to conduct background checks on these types of gaps, even if not longer, so it's unclear how thoroughly the members of the Musk team have been reviewed. According to Wall Wall MagazineSpaceX lawyers "start to analyze the risks of seeking higher security permits Magazine Musk's use of ketamine was reported in June 2023 (2023). . ”
Then there is the risk of corruption and conflict of interest that affect national security. As Elizabeth Popp Berman explains, direct control of federal funds to DingTalk to the president and his agents is very undemocratic because it allows them to deprive Congress of the funds allocated by the law, to make it allocated to anyone by Congress. While giving money to reward political allies - no Congressional supervision or approval is required. This risk of corruption also applies to Musk, who can now view and potentially stop government payments to corporate competitors and can try to design the U.S. government system in ways that benefit his own private financial interests.
American allies and partners work with the United States because they believe that the institutions and people behind their foreign policy have been censored and act on behalf of the United States rather than on private entities. Adversaries may not like the United States, but until now, they have known how to get to Washington when necessary, how to do business with the U.S. government, and how they can push our systems and people to us.
These elements of trust are part of the invisible cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. If an allies are concerned that individuals who have no government experience and who have not passed typical security protocol reviews will access the intelligence, especially will be reluctant to share sensitive intelligence information. Musk and his team have found the most rigorous private federal data that will make the United States the object of distrust of people who interact with the invisible machinery of U.S. national security.
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