In 2021, at the first meeting of senior Chinese foreign policy officials in the Biden administration, Beijing’s top diplomat Yang Jiechi announced that the United States can no longer “talk with China in terms of strength and status.” This statement seems to disturb us Secretary of State Anthony Blink and U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan have proven to be illuminating to understand China's strategic prospects. In the following four years, Beijing has operated on this assumption A profound shift in the balance of power between the two countries is underway. Chinese strategists believe in their decades of "strategic weaknesses" in their country's competition with the United States are about to end, driven by steady progress in China's industrial, technological and military capabilities and the growth of its international influence. This progress has ushered in the perception that Beijing sees as a “strategic deadlock” with the United States, in which both countries now have comparable powers.
((Read the Chinese version. )
The re-election of U.S. President Donald Trump has not made Beijing optimistic about Beijing, as it can continue to threaten from the United States, ensure lasting equilibrium and compete for global supremacy. Trump's second early action strengthened Beijing's belief that the United States is accelerating its own decline and bringing the new era of equality closer. What China may not have Faced with the stable impact of the U.S. survival threat has had on Beijing's policies, Beijing responded patiently to Trump's response after the escalation of trade tensions in April, expecting Trump to eventually lower U.S. tariffs to achieve a deal.
But while the immediate risk of a conflict between the United States and China is low, the current deadlock may not last. Over the next four years, the risk of a military crisis may increase as the two countries increasingly test each other's determination. By the time Trump's current tenure approaches the conclusion, China will have enough opportunities to reassess the US domestic political environment, its commitment to Taiwan, its global economy's dependence on the island's semiconductor industry, and the trajectory of China's own economic development and military modernization. Beijing's risk could escalate sharply if Beijing further narrows the capacity gap with Washington and sees international indifference to Taiwan's status, indifference to Taiwan's status, unite Taiwan with China, and foresee more and more frustration in leaders in Washington and Taipei. Today, the strategic impasse seems to be able to quickly turn into something more turbulent and dangerous between the two countries.
Beijing has been willing to stand by as Trump unilaterally weakens the United States' position in the world. Despite the Trump administration’s active tariffs on China, many Chinese strategists have downplayed the frequent international concerns that trade wars increase the risk of military conflict. In their eyes, the increased trade tensions are just the first phase of Trump's signature negotiation strategy: try to squeeze, then back, and then Agree to reach an agreement. It seems China is content to let Trump's trademark strategy run it forward and expects the United States to face serious economic and diplomatic consequences.
Beijing has shown that even on the interests of core countries such as Taiwan, it is rarely inclined to initiate recent military conflicts. However, such restrictions are underwritten by a military accumulation spanning conventional and nuclear forces, which Chinese officials believe is crucial to changing the balance of power with the United States. Trump's fixation on "card-holding" in international disputes It only strengthened Beijing's belief in difficult power rules. Beijing believes that it is OK to gain the upper hand.
Despite Trump's interest in arms control dialogue with China and Russia, Beijing officials believe the White House is unstable and disconnected decisions are a barrier to any potential large bargaining. They are less willing to take cooperative security measures and give priority to the development of China's own military capabilities. As the US's global power disappears rapidly, international pressure on China to join arms control negotiations will be reduced. And, Beijing saw The U.S. defense industry foundation is staggering and hindered by an increasingly disordered governance system. Trump's posture, including his commitment to maintaining the world's most powerful military power and his proposal to build a "Golden Dome" missile defense system, no longer rings in Beijing as before. Beijing has effectively cost U.S. resources at a very small price as the United States moves resources to efforts to defend its own homes against China's relatively low-cost attack capabilities.
China's military accumulation and its assessment of the US stagnation also made Beijing more determined to act to shape the actions of smaller countries in the region. As Washington's capabilities and credibility erode, China is openly courting U.S. allies such as Australia, Japan and South Korea, while drawing a stronger red line around its core interests. In China, it seems paradoxical that its economic and diplomatic outreach and its military muscle bending during high-profile exercises near Australia and Japan in February is characterized by the actions China believes it has become a major force.
The main of these interests is Taiwan. Despite growing political and military tensions since Taiwan President Lai Ching-te took office in 2024, despite growing political and military tensions, the China, the Taiwan Work Conference and the convening of the Chinese Communist Party’s “two meetings” meeting in March are more associated with the relationship compared to the recent changes in Beijing’s Taiwan strategy, which is an increasingly leapfrog grocery. This suggests that the threat of attacks has not increased significantly in the short term.
Although the recent meeting of the Communist Party of China did not suggest that China's military operations against the island are about to take place, the risk of medium-term conflict is increasing. In recent years, Beijing's strategy has evolved from mainly preventing Taiwan's independence to actively pursuing unification, and ultimately achieving the CCP's 2021 plan "the overall strategy to resolve the Taiwan issue in the new era" to actively pursuing unification.. Details are limited, but the new approach seems to emphasize China's influence in Taiwanese society, making Taiwanese view unity as the worst option. According to Taiwan authorities, Beijing has been working with Taiwanese civil society organizations, political parties and influential people to weaken Taipei’s narrative, distribute Chinese ID cards to Taiwanese citizens, and even ensure a commitment to loyalty from Taiwanese people. officer. China may see measures such as legitimate, and Taiwan’s countermeasures, such as Lai’s 17-point countermeasures to combat such infiltration, appear to be Beijing, as Beijing is an act of personal independence of resistance that requires China to strengthen its air and sea invasions and carry out larger bold machines. Beijing, which largely rejected Lai's government, had little hope that his leader would win Taiwan's 2028 presidential election, increasing the possibility of escalation with Taipei. Ultimately, even non-military unification measures seen by Beijing as peacefully believe, are at risk of military conflict that may attract In the United States.
Trump's lack of clear foreign policy priorities will amplify this risk. He is unwilling to clash with major powers, lack of interest in defending other democracies, and a huge commitment to Taiwan's officials. Many in Beijing suspect that if any U.S. president can quietly tolerate China's forced takeover of Taiwan, it will be Trump. China's military exercises in the Strait in early April were partly to address his determination. The Trump administration’s verbal condemnation of the response did not impress Beijing, with Chinese analysts highlighting the relatively heavy nature of the U.S. response.
Other limiting forces are also rapidly decreasing. As the United States nakedly forces allies and opponents, the region and later smaller states Facing new dilemma. They have fewer Incentives that inspire China, especially because it positions itself as a relatively predictable, damaged global force that always outweighs the United States in terms of economic and military growth. As a fragment of the Western Group led by the US, international will and capabilities put pressure on China, which may disappear in a more extreme world in Taiwan’s constraints.
On one hand, the Trump administration is strengthening U.S. military deterrence against China as it pays more and more attention to Beijing’s active actions in Asia. But internal cracks hindered efforts. Driven by executives eager to implement the presidential agenda, Beijingers suspect that the U.S. ability to strengthen its military capabilities has destabilized the Pentagon and the broader bureaucracy, and the broader bureaucracy. Senior Defense Department officials have not fully abide by the importance of Taiwan to the U.S. strategy. For example, Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon’s policy director, said, “Without it, Americans can survive” and instead promote China’s broader regional dominance. Trump's own commitment to Taiwan further risked the hollowing of any military preparation. His recent rejection of senior National Security Council officials was not enough to be a good deal of his “America First” foreign policy commitment, which warned like-minded peers throughout the administration.
Meanwhile, the ratchet of tensions caused by the trade war strengthens national cohesion within China. Even the country’s most liberal strategist, who previously criticized U.S. policy, now labels Washington as an invader and advocates stricter measures to fight back us Economical and foreign policy pressure. For many, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s prediction of “a huge change that has not been seen in a century” seems prescient. However, this internal consensus is growing, and it is unlikely that Beijing will conduct critical self-reflection to eliminate its strategic plans and more likely to strengthen its military construction and pursue unity.
Similarly, Trump’s need for loyalty and his extensive use of executive power to implement compliance and compliance across the government has also eroded the government’s self-assessment capabilities. And, without the opposition within the government, the United States cannot plan and develop effective military deterrence and responsibly manage future military crises.
Ultimately, these internal dynamics (more than long-term trade and foreign policy disputes) turn strategic deadlocks into the greatest threat to an acute crisis. To reduce the risk of catastrophic conflict, strategists in Beijing and Washington should look inward and scrutinize their leadership skills before an uneasy deadlock stops being held.
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