President Donald Trump loves flexibility. He is not affected by the process of change, and he is unwilling to be bound by past precedents or his own promises. Although he has promised to quickly end the war in Ukraine, and although Washington has just signed an agreement with Keefe to grant a portion of future income from Ukrainian mineral reserves, Trump can decide that he can decide to leave the country altogether if he doesn't desire a peaceful solution. The last paragraph of the mineral agreement has not been made public, but there is no indication that it includes Ukraine's security assurance. As Commander-in-Chief, Trump can suddenly and greatly minimize our support.

However, Ukraine's standout from the United States is not abandoned by Ukraine. After three years of war, dozens of countries now support Ukraine's increasingly powerful military power. There are no allies that can replace the United States, but all allies have a difference: the power to end the war by withdrawing is not within the power of the United States. Although Ukraine will strive to sustain the boundaries without the support of the United States, Russia has no easy way to win. The real risk of a sharp withdrawal of support is not the immediate collapse of Ukraine, but the possibility that European countries will lose their political will to stand with Russia.

If the United States abandons Ukraine, Europe will suffer many misfortunes. European leaders will conclude that Washington is committed to normalizing its ties with Moscow and no longer interested in providing the reliable deterrent that decades have been provided. They will think that the Trump administration’s abandonment of Ukraine is the first step towards a post-European, if not a post-American world. In this context, Moscow may induce Europe to scare Europe, and some Europeans may choose to lie rather than risk Russia's anger.

On defense

The Trump administration is unlikely to endorse another additional support program in Ukraine. In a few months, the number of weapons and ammunition from the United States to Ukraine will decrease. Even if Trump seeks Ukraine’s economic gains in the form of an income sharing agreement, the United States may cut or block the target and intelligence support it provides. Although Russia will still strive to win the war, there is no need to worry about losing it. It could tend to undermine Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure and intimidate Ukrainians from the country’s strategy. Kiev has the human, resources and support to maintain sovereignty in most areas of the country, but the Russian army can slowly advance and achieve Putin's goal, even if four regions in Ukraine are completely under his control.

Ukraine lacks the ability to obtain offensive gains and it is difficult to resolve the war according to its terms. After successfully defending Kief in the spring and summer of 2022, Ukraine made bold moves in the south and east, recapturing the city of Helsen and liberating a large amount of territory in the Kharkif region. Last July, Ukraine even occupied Russian territory in the Kursk region. But as time passed, Ukraine exhausted its offensive capabilities and Russia gradually drove Ukrainian troops out of Kursk. Ukraine occasionally conducts drone strikes within Russia, and the degradation of Russian naval power in the Black Sea is impressive, but Kiev lacks manpower and supplies to occupy a large amount of territory. Ukraine has been fighting from the great war in 2022 and 2023 to the defensive war that has been going on since the end of 2024.

Without the help of the United States, the support of the rest of the allies is crucial to Ukraine. Ukrainian forces are innovative in the use of drone warfare, and European countries will continue to provide military assistance. But Ukraine will suffer from severe air defense shortages, and missile strikes across the front are essentially irresistible. Kyiv will have to rations for ammunition and will lose the latest information on the battlefield. Even if Europeans decide to strengthen, the goal will be very difficult without the technology of the United States.

Ukrainian leaders know what risks are and what will happen. Kyiv will have to make difficult choices in which territory can be defended. However, between the heroism and efficiency of Ukraine's military and the continued support of the remaining allies, Russia has no real path in Ukraine. Due to the US abandonment of Ukraine, the loss of life on the Russian side will not stop. This war will remain a strategic mistake for Russia. Even so, this abandonment would greatly burden Europe, questioning Washington's commitment to its European allies and potentially creating a spiral of tension between Europe and Russia.

Post-Europe

The Trump administration may think that Ukraine's fate has nothing to do with the future of the NATO alliance. The reality is that Ukraine is a key figure in European security. The country is a containment laboratory for the twenty-first century and has been a hidden transatlantic policy toward Russia since 2022. The U.S. retreat from Ukraine told Moscow that Washington no longer promised to check Russia's spread in Europe. Seeing the green light, Russia will easily test the foundations of European security, which is not necessarily through invasion but through intimidation and ransomware.

Russian President Vladimir Putin can target EU or NATO member states that he believes are weak or internally divided. Maybe one of the Baltic countries or Romania. He could invent the crisis, perhaps claiming that the country is persecuting a Russian minority and conveying a passion to escalate, for example, showing the influence of Russian missiles. If the United States is unwilling to support the target countries, the larger European powers (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) will need to participate. But without the United States, they may not be able to force Russia to retreat. The joint nuclear arsenal of Britain and France is not enough to prevent Moscow from engaging in nuclear first use of ransomware or conventional threats. Without a reliable U.S. security umbrella, Russia regards NATO as a paper tiger.

In post-Europe, Moscow will build a piece of personal relationship with European countries, with some facing territorial threats and grey regional tactics (such as disinformation movements), and with cheap energy to repay others' acquiescence. These situations may inspire some European countries to establish neutral or even partnerships with Russia. Putin is no longer under the control of the US's balance powers like the US, so European influence can be reestablished. Then, the hegemonic transatlantic alliance (the dragon that Russian strategists have been trying to kill since the late 1990s) will no longer be like this.

To be sure, Russia has no military capacity to occupy European territory outside Ukraine, which is likely not Moscow's basic intention. But through terrifying and seductive Europe, Putin can push the wedge in transatlantic relations and undermine European projects.

The core of European security

The prospect of American loyalty instilled fear among Europeans. It has prompted higher EU defense spending. But Europeans, including the UK, are still not ready to assume full responsibility for their defense. They have no political will to take joint action. They lack money, military hardware (especially key drivers such as intelligence and airlift capabilities) and the command and control structures necessary for any European defense. These capabilities will not be ready for years (and possibly decades), and even if extended to other European countries, the nuclear umbrellas of France and Britain are not suitable for Russia. Only the United States can ensure reliable nuclear deterrence.

Some European countries, desolate by the United States, lack a limited European defense alliance, may timidly reach an agreement with Moscow. They may rebuild trade relations, or require Russian stations for European troops and hardware. Europe has become popular with parties willing to accommodate short-term gains for the Kremlin. And, because the expected outcome (Europeans defend their own abilities without the United States) may take more than a decade to achieve, citizens may be reluctant to vote for politicians to commit to investing in defense today.

Even countries willing to stand up with Russia may still be willing to give up short-term bilateral deals with the United States and give up the long European Ministry of Defense work. Poland has asked the United States to deploy nuclear warheads on Polish soil rather than on Western Europe. If a contest to get help from Washington subsequently, Trump will enjoy the Europeans who face each other. Over time, the European security landscape may return to the complex and confusing security agreements and guarantee treaties before the war, binding some countries to one another while excluding others. In chaos, competition among European countries is entirely possible. Whether the EU can withstand such developments or survive without a US-led NATO is an open question. A fragile Europe will only benefit Russia.

To avoid drifting in Europe's division and conflict, the Trump administration should not entrust Ukraine to the periphery of Europe. Nor should it be viewed only in economic terms. Instead, Washington should build on the recently agreed mineral agreement and work on Ukraine’s long-term security; being able to defend its sovereignty, Ukraine will help stabilize the entire region, a core interest of the United States.

Since the Soviet Union's independence in 1991, Ukraine has been often deprived of its important position in European security buildings. At the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, the alliance promised Ukrainian membership, a promise that was forgotten by inaction. In multiple rounds of diplomacy in 2014 and 2015, France and Germany spent more effort on plastic surgery hostilities than addressing potential issues of regional security after Russia acquired Crimea and invaded Ukraine’s Donbas region. The result was about eight years later, a brutal invasion of Russia, which created waves of insecurity throughout Europe. Today, Ukraine's position is undoubtedly the core of European security.

Without the United States on the side of Ukraine, Europe would face an impossible choice. European countries will have to fill gaps in their own security and defense investments and in Ukraine. The pressure of limited resources or the moderate relationship between Washington and Moscow may prompt Europeans to reduce their support for Kiev, undermining their long-term security in the process. In addition, the U.S. abandonment of Ukraine will complicate NATO's ability to stop Russia. Currently, Moscow is tied up in Ukraine and cannot afford more expansionist causes. But if the Trump administration believes Ukraine is not worthy of our partnership and cooperation, Putin's ambitions will only grow - and the cost of preventing Russia in the future. If Washington now abandons Ukraine, Europe could become a consumption crisis for Trump’s second term.

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