President Donald Trump's idea of ​​the "Golden Dome" missile defense system poses a series of potential strategic dangers to the United States.

Golden Dome aims to protect the United States from ballistic, cruise and treble missiles and launch missiles from space. Trump calls for full operation before the end of his term before the end of his term.

Trump's goal on the Golden Dome may not be achieved. Extensive research has clearly shown that even defense capabilities are much more expensive than Trump envisions and are much less efficient than Trump expected, especially against enemy missiles equipped with modern countermeasures. Countermeasures include multiple warheads per missile, bait warheads and warheads that can be manipulated or difficult to track.

Regardless of the feasibility of the Golden Dome, scholarships on strategic defense measures have a long history, the weight of evidence demonstrates defensive capabilities that keep their host countries from nuclear attacks.

I am a professor of national security and foreign policy at Harvard University, where I lead the "Management Atoms", the university's main research group on nuclear weapons and nuclear energy policy. For decades, I have been in conversation with Russian and Chinese nuclear experts - their fear of U.S. missile defense has been a consistent theme.

Russian President Vladmir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping have warned that the Golden Dome is stabilizing. A joint statement from China and Russia said the Golden Dome also constitutes “a direct destruction of global strategic stability, promoting an arms race, and promoting an arms race and increasing the potential for conflict across the international arena.” While this is a propaganda statement, it reflects the real concern that is widespread between the two countries.

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History class

Experience going back half a century clearly shows that if the government pursues the golden dome, it is likely to inspire a larger weapon accumulation, which has taken any negotiated nuclear weapons restrictions out of the prospects and even increased the chances of nuclear war.

My first book 35 years ago showed that within the 1972 Anti-Welding Missile Treaty, it would be a benefit of the United States national security, which strictly restricted us and the Soviet Union and later Russia-missile defense. The United States and the Soviet Union negotiated the ABM Treaty as part of Salt I, which restricted the nuclear weapons competition. It was approved in the Senate 98-2.

The impact of the ABM treaty experience on the current Golden Dome is very illuminating.

Why did the two countries agree to restrict defense? First, because they know that unless the defenses of both sides are limited, they will not be able to stop the offensive nuclear weapons race. If both sides want to maintain their ability to retaliate, if other attacks (“Don’t core me, or I’ll core you”), then the obvious answer is that one side builds more defense capabilities is the other side builds more nuclear warheads.

For example, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviets installed 100 interceptors to defend Moscow - so the U.S. warheads against Moscow defeated more warheads in Moscow to flood the Ministry of Defense. If it had ever launched a nuclear war, Moscow would have been more completely eliminated than without defense. Both sides realized that unlimited missile defense would only mean more attacks on both sides, and both were safer than before.

Furthermore, the state sees the opponent's shield as moving in parallel with the nuclear sword. The nuclear first strike could undermine a major part of a country's nuclear power. The defense capabilities of the defensive missiles will inevitably be less effective against what they know, and the chaotic revenge is more effective than opposing large-scale, well-planned surprise attacks. For those who attacked first, this potential advantage could make the nuclear crisis even more dangerous.

Post-ABM Treaty World

Unfortunately, President George W. Bush pulled the United States from the ABM Treaty in 2002 in an attempt to unleash U.S. defenses against potential missile strikes in North Korea's small states. But even decades later, U.S. missile interceptors deployed less than allowed treaties (44) than allowed (100).

The U.S. pullout did not result in immediate weapons accumulation or end of nuclear weapons control. But Putin is completely complaining about U.S. missile defense and the U.S. refusal to accept any restrictions. He believes that the U.S. position is an effort to achieve military superiority by negating Russia's nuclear deterrence.

Russia is investing heavily in new strategic nuclear weapons aimed at avoiding US missile defense, from intercontinental nuclear torpedoes to missiles that can be carried out around the world and launching attacks from the south, while the US defense is mainly directed at Russia.

Similarly, much of China's nuclear accumulation appears to be driven by the desire for a reliable nuclear deterrent, which is the ability to face the U.S. strike its nuclear power and use missile defenses to improve the rest. Indeed, China is so angry that South Korea has deployed regional defenses provided by the United States - they believe it is the ability to help the United States intercept missiles - that it imposed severe sanctions on South Korea.

Burning fire

Now, Trump hopes to develop further, defending "forever ends the missile threat to American homelands" with a success rate "very close to 100%. I think this effort is very likely to lead to nuclear accumulation in Russia and China. Putin XII's joint statement promises to "oppose" the defense "is aimed at achieving military advantage."

Given the ease of developing countermeasures that are difficult to overcome on defense, the odds are the defensive game that will make the U.S. bias worse than before—and much worse.

Putin and XI made it clear that they were particularly concerned about the thousands of space-based interceptors envisioned by Trump. These interceptors are designed to impact missiles when rockets are burned during launch.

Most countries may object to the idea of ​​deploying large numbers of weapons in space – these interceptors are both expensive and fragile. China and Russia can focus on further development of anti-satellite weapons to blow holes in defenses, increasing the risk of space warfare.

There is already a real danger that the entire effort to negotiate restrictions to restore nuclear-weapon racing may be about to end. The last remaining treaty limits us and the Russian nuclear power, the new starting point treaty expires in February 2026. China's rapid nuclear accumulation has led many defense officials and Washington experts to call for a response for the United States.

Strong hostility means that at present, neither Russia nor China are willing to sit down in the form of a treaty or otherwise.

The way forward

I think adding the golden dome to this combustible mixture could end any prospects to avoid unbound and unpredictable nuclear weapons competition in the future. But, stay away from these dangerous paths.

The design of defense capabilities would be very reasonable, which would provide some protection for a few North Korean missiles or other attacks that would not seriously threaten Russia or China's deterrent forces, and designed to limit the parties that would allow parties to plan their offensive powers and know the defensive capabilities they will face in the years.

I think Trump should lower his golden dome ambitions to achieve his other dream - negotiating a deal to reduce nuclear danger.