President Donald Trump will sit down with the Saudi Crown Prince, UAE and Katari leaders on May 14, 2025 as it is a high-stakes summit. Not invited to watch, it will be Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Like many other members of his right-wing coalition, Netanyahu appears to be against Trump's election as U.S. president, and he believes the Republican Middle East policy will undoubtedly approve of Israel's interests and coordinate closely with Netanyahu himself.

But that's not exactly the case. Of course, Washington remains Israel’s most powerful global ally and chief arms supplier. But Trump is promoting a Middle East policy that sometimes goes against the interests of Netanyahu and his administration.

In fact, Trump is undermining his long-standing Netanyahu stance while pushing for an Iran nuclear deal (an unexpected reversal of Trump’s first administration). In Israeli right-wing circles, rumors have been spreading Trump’s announcement of unilateral support for the Palestinian state ahead of his visit to Riyadh – which would represent a clear departure from Washington.

As a historian of Israel and the broader Middle East, I recognize that Trump represents a continuation of U.S. policy in Riyadh’s agenda, especially in establishing security relations with the Arab Gulf monarchy – Israel has long been unpublicly supported by Israel. But in the process, the trip can also occupy important daylight between Trump and Netanyahu.

Trump's official agenda

Trump’s first four-day Bay trip to the Gulf, driven by policy-driven foreign visits, is more about building economic and security relations between the United States and traditional allies of the Persian Gulf.

Trump is expected to consolidate tens of thousands of dollars in trade deals between the U.S. and Arab Gulf countries, including unprecedented arms purchases, investments in the U.S. Gulf and even a floating Katari Gift 747 designed to be used as Air Force One.

It is also possible to establish a security alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

So far, it has been very beneficial to the Israeli government. Prior to the October 7 attack, Israel had already established closer ties with the Gulf countries, establishing transactions and diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain through the Abraham Agreement, and the Trump administration itself promoted potential normalization with the Saruy Arab Republic in September 2020.

Dealing with Tehran

But the heart of the Riyadh agenda this week will be the issue where Trump and Netanyahu are increasingly different on the same page. Start with Iran.

While the country will not be represented, Iran will host a lot of features at Trump’s summit as it is consistent with diplomatic negotiations between the U.S. government and Tehran on its nuclear program. These negotiations have now ended four rounds. Despite clear challenges, the delegations of the United States and Iran continued to express optimism about the possibility of a deal.

The approach marks a change in Trump, who in 2018 abandoned a deal similar to the one he now seeks to fake. This also shows that the United States currently opposes the idea of ​​a clear preference for direct armed confrontation with Iran with Netanayhu.

Diplomacy with Tehran is also favored by Gulf countries, a way to include Iran's nuclear ambitions. Even Saudi Arabia-Tehran's long-term regional rival, like Israel, opposes Obama-era Iranian nuclear diplomacy, increasingly seeks more cautious interactions with Iran. In April, the Saudi defense minister visited Tehran ahead of the recent U.S.-Iran negotiations.

Netanyahu built his political career on the imminent threat of nuclear Iran and the need to undermine such threats in the bud. His failure to successfully undermine President Barack Obama's initial efforts to reach an agreement with Iran, which led to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. But Netanyahu has more luck with Obama's successor, helping to convince Trump to withdraw from the deal in 2018.

So Trump is going to turn the corner in the Iran conversation, which angers Netanyahu - not only because it happened, but because it happened so publicly. In April, the U.S. president called Netanyahu to the White House and said Washington was embarrassing him on diplomatic negotiations with Tehran.

Split in Yemen

It is clear that potential tensions between the Trump administration and the Israeli administration can be seen in the ongoing skirmishes involving the United States, Israel and Yemen’s Husset.

After launching missiles at Tel Aviv airport on May 4, Israel attacked Israel, destroying airports and other facilities in the Yemen capital.

But hours after the Israeli attack, Trump announced that the United States would no longer attack Hotis because they "surrendered" to his demands and agreed not to stop American ships in the Red Sea.

It is obvious that Israel is not involved in this new understanding between the United States and Husey. Trump’s claim is also noteworthy in its timing, and it can be used as a silence to prepare for a trip to Saudi Arabia. This may also contribute to smooth negotiations with Iran, and the fact that this may also be a factor.

The timing is also important in Israel's latest attack on Yemeni ports. They were held on May 11 - Trump set out to visit Saudi Arabia on the eve. In this way, Netanyahu may signal not only to Houthi but to the United States and Iran. Continuing to attack Huthis could make nuclear talk more difficult.

Bibi's political survival priority attitude

Netanyahu's critical observer has long believed that he prioritized the ongoing war in Gaza rather than the regional calm in order to unite the far-right coalition, they hoped to have full control over the Gaza Strip and the factual annexation of the West Bank.

Many political commentators believe that this is the main reason Netanyahu retreated from the final stage of the ceasefire agreement with Hamas in March, which requires the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip.

Since the ceasefire went down, Israeli troops have mobilized to prepare for the re-attack of Gaza, which was planned to begin after Trump's journey to the Gulf.

As members of the Netanayhu government openly support the permanent occupation of striptease and announced that taking the rest of Israeli hostages is no longer a priority, it seems obvious to me that propaganda is not on Netanyahu's agenda.

Trump himself has recently noticed the shocking state of hostages and the severe humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Now, in addition to the release of Israel - American hostage Edan Alexander, the United States has negotiated with Hamas on a ceasefire and aid - neglecting Netanyahu in the process.

The lowest dollar

Current U.S. policies in the region may all offer Trump a bigger goal: to get billions of dollars in Gulf money for the U.S. economy, and some say. But achieving this requires a stable Middle East, and the ongoing war in Gaza and Iran is closer to nuclear capabilities that could undermine it.

Of course, there is still a way to go to reach a diplomatic agreement on Tehran's nuclear program. Trump's foreign policy is particularly prone to sudden changes. But whether guided by traders’ instincts, to trade and economic transactions with wealthy Gulf countries, or to be guided by sincere (and related desires) to stabilize the region, his administration increasingly adopts policies that violate the interests of the current Israeli government.