In 2019, President Donald Trump recognized then-Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó as the country's interim leader against Nicolás Maduro, who has since 2013 It has ruled the country since the year.

This policy led to Venezuela's formal connection with the United States, consistent with the Trump administration's policy of maximum pressure and desire for regime change when it came to the socialist government in Caracas.

Fast forward six years: The early days of Trump's second administration have seen the U.S. president negotiates with Maduro on the release of detained Americans, and Venezuela is clearly willing to accept thousands of nationals to be expelled from the U.S.

As a diplomat serving in Venezuela and knowing Maduro’s former and mentor Hugo Chavez, I found a subtle shift in the growing Trump administration’s policy toward Venezuela. Indeed, the government retained the strong dose of anti-Maduro poses held last time, especially in light of the election fraud that Maduro had widely condemned in 2024, and Washington's rebellion, towards Latin America. left-wing authoritarianism.

But during his second Trump term, U.S.-Venezuela relations were affected by other factors and dynamics, including Trump’s desire to trade and the commitment to fulfill his campaign promise to deport immigrants back to Latin America. Meanwhile, Trump needs to balance satisfactory anti-Maduro voices in his alliance, rather than pushing Venezuela further toward China, a country that is willing to exert greater influence in parts of Latin America.

Transactions and Immigration

So far, the second Trump administration seems to stick to an unofficial recognition of Maduro's route rather than leaving the scene. It keeps the country's sanctions intact and continues to recognize Maduro's rival, Edmundogonzález, as the legitimate president-elect.

But that didn't stop the government from negotiating. In late January, Trump’s envoy, Richard Grenell, visited Caracas to ensure Venezuela’s allegations of freeing six Americans to destabilize the country. Trump then announced that Maduro would accept the deportation of Venezuelans in the United States.

On February 10, two Venezuelan planes returned nearly 200 expelled Venezuelan nationals from the United States, a signal that negotiations between the two countries were more than just optical services. But the Trump administration has sent Venezuelan detainees to a military camp in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and is trying to send more - still proven to sting on the side of any diplomatic thaw.

In any case, the shift in stance on Venezuela has attracted the attention of some Republicans and Democrats. They are concerned that Grinnell's visit and the White House proposals make the Maduro regime a veneer of legitimacy.

But as long as Trump’s Venezuela under Maduro’s leadership is useful to his deportation targets, I think other issues with the U.S. government and the Caracas administration may remain secondary importance.

Rhetoric and reality

Maduro is a complex dynamic, ideological objection to two men but aware of the usefulness of the other. The Venezuelan leader congratulated Trump on his election victory in November, and he seemed to treat his stronger opponents with some pragmatism. However, Maduro is still willing to speak with a sharp attitude, even suggesting that Venezuela may "liberate" Puerto Rico if the United States continues to interfere in Venezuela's affairs.

Aside from rhetoric, Maduro - the obvious willingness to deal with the new government, dealing with him in the form of hostages and immigrants, proves that he pursues his self-interest where possible. He would be well aware that the survival of his rule might be related to the economic situation of the country.

Venezuela has been severely hit by U.S. sanctions since 2017.

The poverty level in the country is estimated to account for about 80% of the population. This bleak economic situation is slowly improving, but despite its abundant reserves, it is still hampered by slow oil production.

Under Biden, despite the sanctions, the U.S. has provided some exemptions for oil companies to work in Venezuela, which has helped the troubled export industry recover some lost productivity.

Maduro will want to see how he can work with the Trump team to continue such a allowance and avoid a complete embargo. But the government's recent noises mixed together in this regard. On January 20, Trump suggested that he might insert Venezuelan oil exports into the United States, "We don't have to buy their oil. We have a lot of oil ourselves," he said.

Such a move will severely hit Venezuela's economy, which has benefited from an increase in U.S. exports in recent years. But the move could face resistance from oil producers such as Chevron, which owns a U.S. company that operates in Venezuela.

Election fraud and beyond

Trump will be shocked by the elements of his base or government, which is mainly viewed from the perspective of the defeat of the socialist authoritarian rival.

In 2024, Maduro launched a great election fraud in Latin America. Computer printouts show Gonzalez and Maria Corina Machado's opposition movement won the July election. However, Maduro declared himself the winner without evidence.

Many in Trump’s circle view fraudulent elections as another reason for the state Hawkesh, a position that takes into account both ideological and electoral considerations.

Trump knows that Florida has a strong anti-communist Venezuelan who want to be strong against Maduro's Cuban government. The new U.S. administration's deportation policy has already involved this strong Trump voting basis. Any relaxation of Maduro can be seen as further "betrayal".

Trump has appointed several long-standing men to Maduro, including his national security adviser Mike Waltz and Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

Rubio, in particular, is a long-time critic of any accommodation in Venezuela. He has spoken with opposition leaders, known as legitimate president González, tortured any relaxation of sanctions and called the Maduro government "the Nalco trafficking organization" at the confirmation hearing.

Rubio has been seizing Venezuelan leaders' planes when U.S. envoy Genell shook hands with Maduro. On February 6, the U.S. Secretary of State personally supervised its confiscation during a visit to the Dominican Republic, where it has been seized since last year.

Competition with China

In his first administration, Trump failed to work hard to encourage the replacement of Maduro.

In any case, the Venezuelan government under Maduro (like Chavez) has shown the ability to withstand our pressure.

In any intention of the United States to influence Venezuela's future, it has brought further wrinkles to Venezuela's future, and it is China's role in the country, and Maduro's intimate relationship with Beijing is becoming increasingly close. Contrary to Western leaders, Chinese President Xi Jinping congratulated Maduro after his victory in 2024. China is the main importer of Venezuelan crude oil and has signed a series of bilateral trade and tourism conventions on economic lifeline.

For some American Eagles, China's influence over Maduro represents what Monroe doctrine envisions, which violates the long-term vision of the United States as regional hegemony. Other voices within the administration - including Trump, who have a very different expression of their diplomatic proposals to Beijing or Elon Musk, who has broad commercial interests in China.

Ultimately, any avenue Trump chooses in relation to Venezuela may be based on the faction’s victory in his administration and which political voters the president is most keen to please.