The author is a co-director of the Itinera Institute, a Brussels-based think tank and the author of Superpower Europe: The Silent Revolution of the EU.
The EU faces the challenge of a new world order. May 9 marks its official "Europe Day", a celebration of peace and solidarity, in stark contrast to the outside world. Europe sat alone: Russia is the enemy, China is the opponent and companion, and Donald Trump's America is a threat or responsibility.
The group essentially has three main options. 1: Be an American in Europe. This means developing what is needed to project European power, bundling third countries with European PAX, building on a large market with integrated technology and security capabilities, ultimately flanking the rebuilt NATO.
To get there, Europe will have to make a Chinese economically: rebuilding a strong industrial and technological foundation. Then it will not only dominate its Eurasian theatre, but also dominate Russia, while achieving a certain degree of geopolitical independence in the wider world.
The second option is to position the EU as the last bastion of globalization. It will follow the footsteps of the Joe Biden administration in the United States, interacting with like-minded countries while masking strategic industries with higher protectionism.
The strategy will ultimately involve China or the United States as security support. But as long as Trumpism means our indifference or worse, the EU may have to consider being its own “reverse Kissinger”: the conditions for Beijing to have a partnership with Moscow in the trade war with Washington. Europe's position relative to Russia will be one of limited trade and diplomatic normalization rather than an adversarial dominance.
The third option is that the EU continues to play the second violin in the United States. In the short term, this means rebuilding the group as the first agenda of the United States: reaching a U.S.-friendly trade agreement with Trump, paying Ukraine's stable bills, while allowing the U.S. to make U.S. business interests a reality in rebuilding and mining, and competing for the U.S. in China.
In return, Europe will benefit from the minimum guarantee of U.S. security assurance while integrating it into U.S.-led technology and financial markets. In the medium term, deeper partnerships may reappear as long as the United States becomes less isolated while remaining competitive with China, reflecting both the reality of the earth’s economy and the shared need for burdens in the new world order.
Which option is currently adopted by the EU? Short answer: All of the above are at the same time. It is developing a common capability for national defense and security while pursuing industrial policies. It continues to promote international trade, including European trade, and Europe produces more. It is exploring trade deals with Trump, especially protections related to Ukraine.
This shows extraordinary political creativity. But Europe has not cleverly hedged its bets in a world of evolving diseases. Instead, it insists on the status quo and only responds to external shocks in fragmented ways.
If Europe cannot be proactive and strategic, then geopolitical transcurrent will eventually divide it politically and marginalize it geopolitically. European countries face challenges of a new world order, not choice. They either successfully triggered a response through the EU or the country's individual responses would gradually put the group in trouble. The emergence of temporary "willed alliances" is a benign harbinger that may become an existential threat.
If Europe becomes the master of its own destiny again, it should be simple to set up its geopolitical compass. To conduct an inspection of Russia, it requires sufficient economic independence from the United States and from China, and requires huge hard power and autonomy. The latter guarantees that Europe will be able to undergo a transatlantic reset with trump US, a situation that will deepen through trade relations with China in the short term.
European countries must realize that the “European Project” is now a tough project that requires a geostrategic footprint beyond its current boundaries. We've been here before. In the early 1950s, post-war European attempts failed to institutionalize political and defense cooperation. At that time, it was the protection of the United States and a European economic community that promoted peace and prosperity. Today, we are working hard for ourselves. With economic development’s submission to geopolitics, failure is simply not an option.