Russia's war economy could bring Moscow to the negotiating table

Russian President Vladimir Putin visited an exhibition on April 30, 2025 at the Central Museum of the Great Patriotic War in Poklonnaya Gora, Moscow, Russia.

Alexander Kazakov | By Reuters

Russia has little interest in peace talks with Ukraine despite Moscow showing what war experts call a “performance ceasefire” and U.S. President Donald Trump convinced Russian leader Vladimir Putin to talk to Kyiv.

In fact, it is widely believed that Moscow plans to launch a new summer offensive in Ukraine to consolidate territorial growth in the southern and eastern regions of the country, with its troops partially occupying. If successful, the offense may bring more leverage to Russia.

While Russia seems reluctant to seek peace now, it has added economic and military pressure at home, including the supply of military hardware and recruitment of soldiers, to sanctions on exports of income such as oil – which may be the ultimate driving Moscow to the negotiating table.

"Russia will seek to strengthen offensive action to increase pressure during negotiations, but cannot bear it indefinitely," Jack Watling, a land warfare researcher at the Royal Joint Services Institute in London, said in an analysis on Tuesday.

Watling said Russian stocks of military equipment left over from the Soviet era (including tanks, artillery and infantry fighting vehicles) would be exhausted between now and late in the month, meaning Russia's ability to replace losses will be entirely dependent on what it can produce from scratches.

"At the same time, while Russia can fight against two other campaign seasons through its current recruitment method, further offensive actions may require further forced mobilization, which is politically and economically challenging," Watling speculated.

CNBC has contacted the Kremlin to respond to comments and is awaiting a reply.

Economic slowdown

Meanwhile, when it comes to Russia's war-centric economic aspects, dark clouds are on the horizon, which is working under the weight of international sanctions and indigenous pressures, which are also largely due to wars such as rampant inflation, high food and production costs, and even Putin is described as "shocking."

The Russian Central Bank (CBR) has become a process of maintaining high interest rates high (21%) to reduce inflation, which is 10.2%. CBR said in May that a dissolution process is underway, but inflation still needs "extended tight monetary policy" to return to the 4% target in 2026. Meanwhile, the marked slowdown in Russia's economy has surprised some economists.

“Russia’s GDP grew from 4.5% year-on-year to 1.4% in the first quarter with a sharp decline in output, which suggests that the economy could drop much harder than we expected.

“We were surprised by the sharp decline in GDP growth despite our expectations of a sustained decline this year,” he noted. “In the first half of this year, a technology recession may be possible, and GDP growth over 2025 is likely to be significantly lower than our current forecast of 2.5%.

In this pool photo distributed by Russian state agency Sputnik, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Uralvagonzavod, the main tank factory in the country's Urals, on February 15, 2024, in Nizhny Tagil.

Ramil Sitdikov | AFP | Getty Images

Alexander Kolyandr, senior researcher at the European Center for Policy Analysis, said that the growth that still exists in the Russian economy is concentrated in manufacturing, especially the Ministry of Defense and related industries, and is being driven by national spending.

"After three years of militarization, Russia's economy is cooling down.

Russian officials are not controversial, and the Ministry of Economic Development predicts that economic growth will drop from 4.3% in 2024 to 2.5% this year.

"The economy is not demobilized; it's just running out of steam. That is, the decline can easily become a dive. The wrong decisions of policymakers, oil prices fall further or careless about inflation, Russia may be in trouble."

Sanctions and oil price bites

In particular, uncontrollable factors began to hurt Russia, including stricter sanctions on Russia’s “shadow fleet” (iron illegal transport of oil by ships to avoid sanctions imposed after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine), and a drop in oil prices due to demand caused by Trump’s global tariff policy.

On Thursday, benchmark Brent futures expired in July were $64.94 a barrel, while Frontmonth July US West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil was $61.65. According to LSEG data, the last price of Russian benchmark Ural crude oil is $59.97.

In early 2025, Brent traded at $74.64 per barrel, while WTI and Urals crude traded at $75.13 and $70.04, respectively.

The Russian Finance Ministry said in April that oil and gas revenues have fallen by 24% this year compared to earlier estimates, with its oil price forecast lowering to $56 from $69.7 per barrel. The ministry also raised its budget deficit estimate for 2025 to 1.7% of GDP, from a previous forecast of 0.5%.

Archive photo: Nevskiy Prospect, a crude oil tanker owned by Russia's leading tanker group Sovcomflot, spanned Bosphorus on September 6, 2020 in Istanbul, Türkiye.

Yoruk Isik | Reuters

Rusi analyst Watling pointed out that lower oil prices will "severely limit Russia's revenues while its reserves are running out."

"The continued implementation of the shadow fleet of Russia and the Ukraine's deep strike movement may reduce liquidity to date, and to date, Russia has been able to steadily increase defense production and provide huge bonuses for volunteers joining the military," he said.

If Western allies can sustain and strengthen efforts to downgrade the Russian economy, and Ukrainian forces “denied that Russia has denied Russia’s arrival at the border of Donetsk (in eastern Ukraine) between now and Christmas, Moscow will face a difficult choice regarding the cost of preparing for the continued war.”

"In this case, the Russians could be transformed from Pomkin's negotiations to actual negotiations," Watling said.