Founding a country is a valuable commodity. After a series of creations that took place after the collapse of the Soviet Union, only three new countries have been recognized over the past 30 years, namely East Tomor, 2002, Montenegro, 2006 and 2011 in South Sudan. There are many other attempts in this interval. However, most people are hampered by the principle of territorial integrity, which will prioritize fixed boundaries and make the pathways of legal independence long and uncertain even in the event of a state failure.
But over the past few years, this norm has become weaker. In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine with the aim of wiping the country's map. Initially encountered shock and horror, Russia's idea of conquering Ukraine has been normalized by US President Donald Trump, who called for Moscow to preserve the land. Trump also threatened to annex Canada and Greenland, the autonomous region of Denmark. How serious he is remains to be seen. But the result is obvious: the United States, the world's most powerful country, no longer regards territorial integrity as an important factor in the global order.
This is certainly good news for some separatist groups. The independence movement no longer has to prove that its causes are or are essential. Instead, they may only need to align with strong countries, especially in strategically important areas. Trump’s preference for personal diplomacy can also help separatists, provided their charismatic leaders can evade clumsy institutional diplomacy and propose to the U.S. president himself.
However, Trump’s rejection of international norms is a double-edged sword. These norms restrict separatists and prevent government repression. They also provide separatists with ways to make claims. The independence movement often justifies its existence using the language of human rights and self-determination, while the ace ignores it. Instead, the US president prefers strong, cruel rulers rather than fleeing the upstart. He has been consistent with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin, who used killing and other types of violence to curb Kurdish and Chechen separatists, respectively. Trump would not care about poor separatists if he could not provide him with immediate returns.
For the independence movement, Trump's era is both an opportunity and a danger. There are fewer restrictions and protection measures for both. For groups he believes are strategically useful (or for some other reason), the road to founding will be easier. But for those who Trump believes are strategically useless, he either changes nothing or makes life more difficult. In a system where recognition depends on leverage rather than law, more movements can try to gain independence. However, without consistent norms or protections, success will remain rare and failure will become more dangerous. More detached regions may get some form of recognition, but it will be weak and partial - about whether their leaders can help stronger countries. The whole world will experience more bloodshed, as governments and separatists are neither bound by global sanctions or normative restrictions and become more confident.
Trump is not the first modern president in the United States to ignore the norms of territorial integrity when they become inconvenient. But Trump was the first to completely ignore the idea for decades. Trump said in February that Ukrainians “maybe Russia or not Russia one day.” He has repeatedly called the U.S.-Canada border “artificially drawn lines.”
These remarks are bad news for the people of Ukraine and Canada, who made it clear that they did not want to join Russia or the United States. But if Trump’s realistic policy approach is achieved, separatist entities may find it easier to gain legitimacy by living with the United States or other major powers. Movements of valuable locations, such as oil-rich Iraqi separatists or Somaliland's leadership (already functionally independent and geographically important corners of Africa) may ensure our recognition and support if they raise Washington's goals. Greenland's separatists seek independence from Denmark or from New Caledonia, seeking independence from France, can get support or other strong support from the United States if they can guarantee a trade route, military base or access to their resources.
In Trump’s world, separatists may also be able to succeed or at least gain attention through diplomacy. Often, separatists are at a disadvantage in negotiations because their channels of formal institutions that usually move are cut off. But Trump usually ignores this standard operating procedure. Instead, he prefers personal diplomacy, such as his 2018 discussion with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. This means that charismatic separatist leaders can court directly the US president.
Split will become a geopolitical transaction.
But Trump’s world can hardly guarantee the success of separatists. The president relaxed restrictions on independence movements, but his preference for strong men and centralized control created new obstacles. Trump tends to favor aggressive national leaders who project power, rather than emerging rebels or subnational challengers. This makes him more likely to support the existing regime of separatist fragments, as long as the regime supports him. For example, during Trump’s first term, Nnamdi Kanu, the leader of the separatist movement in Biavira, Nigeria, issued a personal plead guilty to the U.S. president on the grounds that Trump’s support for Brexit proved his belief in self-determination. However, there is no evidence that Trump responded to Kanu’s appeal publicly or privately. The U.S. government regards Biafra as an internal affairs of Nigeria for decades, which has little strategic value to the United States.
Biafra is hardly alone. Despite nodding to sovereign rhetoric, the Trump administration has little interest in supporting most independence movements, such as the Kurds, Catalans throughout the Middle East or Spain. In October 2019, Trump even ordered the withdrawal of U.S. troops from northern Syria, effectively abandoning the Kurdish-led Syrian democratic forces and allowing Türkiye to conduct military operations against them. The move has attracted bipartisan criticism because it was a betrayal of a reliable partner, and Trump eventually agreed to leave the U.S. troops in Syria (they stayed there). But it still shows that Trump is willing to prioritize regional power politics over friendly separatists.
More generally, Trump’s geopolitical vision is conducive to stable influence, and great power sets the rules. A world separated from the region undermines the control principle that controls this mafia-style view of order. The same is true of standard pro-core arguments, which are concealed in the language of human rights, minority rights, historic injustice and self-determination. In other words, if Trump has a purpose, division can be tolerated. But he is unlikely to encourage it as a principle.
Since Trump’s orders have had different effects on separatists, they will not bring a single result to their movement. Instead, it will reconfigure the terrain of its operation. Split will become a geopolitical transaction, not a legal or moral claim.
However, this change will have some predictable results. A few successful separatist movements over the past three decades have been primarily the result of moral propositions and intensive organization. But now, the success of separatism will depend heavily on the interests of the movement, rather than its legitimacy or efficacy. Separatism, in turn, may stop acting as a tool of imperial resistance, but rather as a tool of the empire itself - meaning to project powerful forces that influence or participate in proxy conflicts (Russia has already achieved by supporting the separation zones of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
As the independence movement perceives new vacancy in a weakened international order, separatist attempts may still increase. But that doesn't mean more success will be achieved. Knowledge will remain rare, both the interests of the great powers often conflict and because they are not subject to norms or economic restrictions, will have the ability to crush the separatist uprising before they gain the foundation. Partially acknowledged cases may become more common than new mature countries such as Kosovo, Northern Cyprus, Palestine and Western Sahara. For example, this recognition could soon extend to the bankrupt parts of Catalonia, Iraqi Kurdistan, Somaliland and Libya and Syria. For places that are already functionally independent, the global order of transactions may open up new diplomatic places or economic channels, bringing them closer to official recognition (of course, of course, to provide strategic value such as basic rights or access to resources. For areas that lack de facto independence, success now will depend on less legal or moral claims.
Violence related to separatism will also become more frequent in this new world of accidental and chaoticism. To some extent, this is merely the product of a reseparatist attempt. But more violent attacks may also be launched in separated areas due to their newly discovered customers and the consequences of violating international law. Likewise, incumbents will feel more capable of using violence to revoke the independence movement. Global institutions that traditionally restrict separatists’ excessive and violent repression are losing their restrictive power. For example, the EU once played a central role in limiting violence between Serbia and Kosovo, for example, using joining negotiations as a leverage to encourage cooperation. The United Nations has helped limit violence in East Timor and South Sudan by providing peacekeeping forces. But ultimately, these institutions gained power from the support of member states, which is weakening. In Trump’s case, Trump has repeatedly attacked both and cut our funds for the UN’s peacekeeping mission.
For the independence movement, new rules of division mean a more turbulent and uncertain future. If success depends on timing, charm and strategic utility, some detachment areas may have shortcuts to endorsement. Others may suffer. But they all have to be in a landscape of sovereignty without gaining sovereignty rather than cynically auctioned.
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