In the latest India-Pakistan standoff, there is no last pass, no red button.

However, the cycle of military retaliation, the signal of cover and the rapid international mediation quietly evokes the most dangerous shadows in the region. The crisis isn't spinning towards nuclear war, but it's a reminder that tension here can summon that ghost.

Even scientists have mimicked how easy things can be taken apart. A 2019 study by a team of global scientists opened, his nightmare scene was terrorists The 2025 attack on the Indian Parliament triggered a nuclear exchange with Pakistan.

Six years later, a real-world stalemate - despite being curbed by a ceasefire by a U.S. agent, there are concerns about a mature conflict. It also restores uneasy memories of the region's vulnerability stability.

As the crisis escalates, Pakistan sends a "two-man signal" - military retaliation while announcing the National Command (NCA) meeting, a computational reminder of its nuclear energy. The NCA is responsible for overseeing the control and potential use of the country's nuclear arsenal. Whether the move is symbolic, strategic or a real alarm, we may never know. According to reports, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio also intervened in the spiral.

President Trump said that the United States is not only a ceasefire, but also avoids "nuclear conflict." Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said in a speech to the country on Monday: “(there) there is no tolerance for nuclear extortion; India will not be intimidated by the nuclear threat.

"Any terror haven based on such an excuse will face a precise and decisive strike," Modi added.

India and Pakistan each own about 170 nuclear weapons, according to the think tank International Peace Institute (SIPRI). As of January 2024, SIPRI estimated that there are 1,211 nuclear warheads worldwide. Of these, about 9,585 people were held in military stocks, with 3,904 actively deploying - an increase of 60 from the previous year. The United States and Russia together account for more than 8,000 nuclear weapons.

Christopher Clary, a security expert at the University of Albany in the United States, said India and Pakistan deployed arsenals in their land-based missile forces, although they are all developing nuclear triads that can transport warheads through land, air and sea.

He told the BBC: "India may have larger air legs (aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons) than Pakistan. While we know Pakistan's fewest naval legs, it is reasonable to assess that India's naval legs are more advanced and more capable than Pakistan's maritime nuclear power."

One reason, Clayli said, is that Pakistan has far less investment in the “time or money” in building nuclear-powered submarines, giving India a “clear qualitative” advantage in naval nuclear capabilities.

Pakistan has never officially announced a formal nuclear doctrine since the test of nuclear weapons in 1998.

By contrast, India adopted a useless policy based on its own 1998 test. But this position shows signs of softening. In 2003, India reserved the right to use nuclear weapons to deal with chemical or biological attacks - effectively allowing first-time use under certain conditions.

Further ambiguity emerged in 2016, when then-rescue minister Manohar Parrikar suggested that India should not be “bound” by the policy, raising questions about its long-term credibility. (Parrikar clarifies that this is his own opinion.)

According to Sadia Tasleem of Carnegie International Peace, the lack of formal doctrine does not mean that Pakistan lacks an official statement, interviews and nuclear development, providing clear clues to its operating posture.

Pakistan's nuclear threshold remains blurred, but in 2001, Khalid Kidwai - then head of the NCA's strategic planning department - outlined four red lines: major territorial losses, destruction of major military assets, economic stifle or political stability.

In 2002, then-President Pervez Musharraf clarified that “nuclear weapons are only targeted at India” and will only be used if “Pakistan’s existence is a country”.

In his memoir, former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo wrote that he was awake at night and spoke to an "Indian colleague" who asked not to be named, fearing that Pakistan is ready to use nuclear weapons during a stalemate with India in 2019.

Around the same time, Pakistani media quoted a senior official who issued a clear warning to India: "I hope you know what (the state command authority) means and what it means. I say we will surprise you. Waiting for this surprise... You chose a path of war without knowing the consequences of peace and security in the region."

During the 1999 Kagir War, Pakistan's then foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmed warned that the country would not "hesitate to use any weapon" to defend its territory. Years later, U.S. official Bruce Riedel revealed that intelligence showed Pakistan was preparing its nuclear arsenal for deployment.

However, both sides have doubts about this statement.

Ajay Bisaria, former Pakistan’s high commissioner for India, wrote in his memoir that Pompeii both exaggerated the risks of nuclear escalation and the role of the United States in balancing the conflict in 2019. Pakistan “knows that the Indian Air Force will not cross its territory” in Pakistan – so even a real nuclear threat does not really trigger the nuclear threat.

"The strategic signal makes the world remind the world that any conflict can spiral - with India and Pakistan, the stakes are higher due to nuclear overhangs. But that doesn't mean that either party is actively threatening nuclear use."

But nuclear upgrades may also happen by chance. "This could be due to human error, hackers, terrorists, computer failures, satellites and unstable leaders," Professor Rutgers University told the BBC.

In March 2022, India accidentally launched a nuclear-capable cruise missile that traveled 124 kilometers (77 miles) into Pakistani territory before crashing, which was said to have damaged civilian property. Pakistan said India has failed to use the military hotline or make a two-day public statement. Experts say the incident could be in serious conflict if this happens during a heightened tension. (A few months later, the Indian government fired three Air Force officials for "accidental shooting of missiles.")

Clary said the danger of nuclear war remains "relatively small", between India and Pakistan.

“As long as there is no significant ground combat along the border, the danger of nuclear use remains relatively small and easy to manage,” he said.

"In ground combat, the 'use or lose it' problem is driven by the possibility that your ground position is occupied by the enemy." ("Use or lose it" means that a nuclear-weapon state may feel the pressure to fire a weapon before being destroyed in the first strike of an opponent.)

"Neither India nor Pakistan want to mark it as the first person to violate the latter's nuclear taboo of attackers," said Sumit Ganguly, a senior researcher at the Stanford University's Hoover Institution.

"In addition, any recourse to the use of nuclear weapons will face significant retaliation and unacceptable casualties," Ganguly told the BBC.

Meanwhile, India and Pakistan seem to be strengthening their nuclear arsenals.

According to the American Federation of Scientists' nuclear notebook, with the development of new development systems, four Prut anti-reactors and expanded uranium enrichment, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal could reach about 200 warheads by the late 2020s.

According to the International International Group on Fissile Materials, as of early 2023, India's weapon-grade content was about 680 kg - enough to accommodate about 130-210 nuclear warheads.

Despite repeated crises and close calls, both sides have managed to avoid a catastrophic slide into nuclear conflict so far. "The deterrent forces are still important. Everything Pakistanis do is react to their opposition strikes," wrote Umer Farooq, an analyst in Islamabad.

However, the emergence of nuclear weapons has injected constant risks – no matter how leadership experiences or how limited it is, this risk can never be completely excluded.

John Erath, senior policy director at the Centre for Nonprofit Weapon Control and Non-Proliferation, told the BBC that “when nuclear weapons are involved, there are always unacceptable levels of danger.”

“In the past, the Indian and Pakistani governments have driven these situations in these situations, so the risk is small. But for nuclear weapons, even the small risks are too great.”