Two members of Elon Musk's government efficiency ministry have obtained a high account of nuclear weapons details on confidential networks, two independent sources told NPR.

Former SpaceX intern Luke Farritor, 23, and Miami-based venture capitalist Adam Ramada have an account on the computer system for at least two weeks, according to sources who can also access the network. Before they worked at Doge, neither Farritor nor Ramada seemed to have no experience in nuclear weapons or handling confidential information.

A spokesman for the Ministry of Energy flatly denied that Farritor and Ramada had access to the network.

"This report is wrong. No Doge personnel have access to these NNSA systems. Two Doge individuals involved worked inside the agency for several days and left Doe in February," a spokesperson told NPR in an emailed statement.

Two sources contacted by NPR refused to be publicly identified because they had no right to talk to the media about the matter. They are able to see the names of Ramada and Farritor directly in the network directory. Thousands of employees involved in nuclear weapons work in facilities and laboratories across the United States can see the network directory, but the network itself can only be accessed on specific terminals designated for secure rooms used to handle confidential information.

According to several experts who have reached NPR, the presence of Doge employees on the network itself is not enough to access the secret information, as several experts involved in NPR say that even the data in the network can be carefully controlled on the basis of the need.

In February, CNN reported that Doge employees, including Farritor, were seeking to use secret computer systems. At the time, Energy Secretary Chris Wright denied that they would be allowed to enter the network.

"I heard these rumors, 'They're like seeing our nuclear secrets.' None of them are true," Wright told CNBC.

Nuclear network

Sources said the network in question was used by the National Nuclear Safety Administration, the internal agencies within the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense that oversees widespread nuclear inventory of the U.S.

The first network, known as the NNSA Enterprise Security Network, is used to transmit detailed "restricted data" about special nuclear materials used in U.S. nuclear weapons design and weapons. The network is used to deliver this extremely sensitive technical information between the NNSA, the country's nuclear weapons laboratories and the production facilities that store, maintain and upgrade the country's nuclear arsenal.

The Ministry of Defense uses a second network called Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) to communicate with the Ministry of Energy about nuclear weapons. SIPRNET is also more widely used to share information classified on a secret level, i.e. information that “if you want to leave, it may harm or harm national security.”

Access to both networks usually requires a "Q" permission, which is the highest security gap for the DOE. Getting a Q clearance is a long process, but can be accelerated in some cases.

Although sources confirmed the existence of the account, it is unclear what classification data the two Doge employees actually have is not clear. Another source familiar with the matter, who spoke with NPR on anonymous due to the sensitivity of the DOE system, said Doe officials' presence on DOE confidential systems would represent Doge's escalation in the latest privileges within the agency, but those accounts would not allow them to access all of these systems' Carte Blanch on those systems.

They call the access "toes," which will allow Doge staff to request information classified on a secret level. "They are going further, and it's worth noting," they concluded. "This could lead to something bigger."

Hans Kristensen, director of nuclear information programs at the American Federation of Scientists, who tracks the U.S. nuclear program, said Doge employees may need access to confidential information to discuss program details and future budget priorities.

Although most of the nuclear weapons budgets are ultimately unclassified, many of the classification details may be used to set these numbers. "I don't think it's open," he said.

The NNSA has felt the impact of the Trump administration’s efforts to cut the administration. In February, hundreds of workers fired the nuclear bureau in the direction of Doge. However, the decision was quickly reversed and eventually dismissed 50 employees.

There is growing concern about Doge's processing of data elsewhere in the government, and news about these accounts is growing.

Earlier this month, NPR reported to whistleblowers of the National Labor and Industrial Relations Commission who had evidence that Doge employees had high levels of access and may have copied and deleted sensitive data from their institution’s internal systems. The Governor's team asked their activity not to be logged in on the system and then tried to cover their tracks by turning off the monitoring tool and deleting their access records. NLRB employees began to pay attention, especially after finding suspicious login attempts from Russian IP addresses using newly created Doge credentials.

This also sparked controversy over the use of publicly encrypted messaging application signals by Defense Minister Pete Hegseth to send sensitive details to Houthi rebels in Yemen. Hegseth's use of the app was revealed after editor-in-chief of the Atlantic editor-in-chief Jeffrey Goldberg. Last week, New York Times A second chat was reported, which included Heggs' wife, brother and personal attorney.

NPR Disclosure: NPR CEO Katherine Maher, Chairman of the Signal Foundation Board of Directors.