In 1973, then-CIA Director William Colby, on the grounds that the CIA is based in Virginia, was the statue of Nathan Hale, a revolutionary war spy. Hale became a strange choice for icons. After all, he was captured and executed by the British. William Casey, one of Colby's successors, complained that Hale "fouled his only mission." Casey left Hale alone, but was compensated by commissioning the statue he thought was more appropriate in the hall, a similarity to William Donovan, nicknamed the Wild Act, a man often referred to as the CIA father.
Casey is not wrong with Hale's incompetence. Hale didn't bother with using the alias, and he leaked the mission to the British officer. Whether or not he actually says that he has only one life to give for his country, he is an idealist, if not completely innocent. Jeffrey P. Roger (Jeffrey P. Spy and the countryone of two new histories of US intelligence. It's an interesting assessment, as Rogg just announced a few pages: The intelligence business is "essentially 'non-American', a practice that is not suitable for "a country that values honesty, transparency, and straightforwardness." It can be made that tempting inference: Hale might be a better spy if he was a worse American.
The question of whether espionage is compatible with the American ideal is old. Among the founders, the current answer is no. Spy is an appendage to the monarchy and is therefore incompatible with the Republican government. In 1797, James Monroe recently recalled from his post as French minister, accusing Secretary of State Timothy Pickering of spies in a painful letter: “This practice is very large in ancient times and is now being used in the European expert government,” he admitted, “but I hope it will never see it handed over to this.”
go through Mark M. Lowenthal
George Washington is an American who has not shared his discomfort at his age. Rogg Beware is not enough. The mission that made his life was Washington's idea, and he authorized at least three kidnapping sites during the war. As the commander of the Continental Army, he is an exquisite intelligence consumer who cultivates a wide range of sources. Lowenthal, a former senior official of the CIA, approved the citation of the post-war British officer protests: "Washington did not really defeat the British, he simply defeated us!"
Washington left his most important intelligence legacy as the first U.S. president. In his harsh attitude, First Congress created a presidential bank account representing spies and created an emergency fund for foreign affairs. Congress controls the amount in the fund, but otherwise has no say in how the fund is used. It can be said that this arrangement is a matter of policy and constitution. The inability of endless public debate to authorize time-sensitive secret activities, and the most natural way to read the Constitution on the subject (which is useless) is akin to the power of the president, serving as commander-in-chief and head of state.
But when establishing the emergency fund, Congress not only surrendered its right to control intelligence operations, but also fully understood their rights. The president was asked to tell lawmakers how much he spent, but where he went without money. Abdication is quite high, and there is a high possibility of abuse.
In the Washington era and in the decades to come, the decision to engage the United States in espionage has aroused little public opposition. Americans still think the unpleasantness of surveillance of opponents, but their administration simply doesn’t do much. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, this was mainly temporary business conducted by diplomats, officers and adventurers. After the Civil War, the Army and Navy developed intelligence services, but these were fringe clothing with little power or bureaucratic respect. Especially in peacetime, the United States does not have a permanent centralized system to collect intelligence. Therefore, few Americans see threats to law or freedom in the president's secrets.
The pattern that defines this period - espionage during war and then disappears in peacetime - encounters a problem with Roger and Lovental, whose descriptions of the years between the Revolution and World War II are filled with longing details. Readers persevere in hundreds of pages of bureaucratic infighting and military history in the hope that a new understanding of the more familiar chapters of the U.S. intelligence will be disappointed. There are suggestive plots along the way - for example, the army used water baskets during a brutal campaign in the Philippines in the early 20th century, or the verse of the Alien Enemy Act of 1798, which President Donald Trump recently flew up dust in cruel ways - but this is the inevitable conclusion, which is an almost strange accident that happened afterwards.
The CIA grew up from the wartime office of Wild Bill Donovan, founded in 1947 and was also part of the National Security Act, which also gave birth to the joint heads of the Ministry of Defense, the National Security Council and the Chief of Staff. Under the bill, the CIA's main responsibility is to coordinate the intelligence gatherings of individual governments. But the statute also directs the agency to “perform other functions and responsibilities related to intelligence related to national security, just as the National Security Council may from time to time directly and directly.” It is a fateful broad legislative grant. The CIA's first general counsel concluded that Congress was not saying that empowering covert operations meant the view of Walter Bedell Smith, the agency's second director, who feared that "the action tail would swing the smart dog."
However, for President Harry Truman, the need to oppose Soviet aggression exceeded any goodwill to legislative intent. In the second half of 1947, he authorized the CIA to interfere in the Italian parliamentary elections, and the Communist Party is expected to perform well there. The institution spent a lot of money on candidates from the centrist Christian Democratic Party, which won a majority in a poll in April 1948. For Truman and his successors, it's a proof of concept: covert operations seem to offer a relatively cheap way to face the Soviet Union without risking a wider war. President Dwight Eisenhower expanded the CIA's brief from influencing elections to topling governments, leading to regime changes in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954. More chillingly, in 1960, he approved (whether expressly or tacitly is still disputed) the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the charismatic leader of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Although the plot disappeared, Lumumba was quickly killed in a CIA-backed coup, and the Kennedy administration continued its role model against Fidel Castro with Eisenhower's example.
Rogg and Lowenthal acknowledged that the CIA's changes in the regime and the rise of assassination have damaged the U.S. government's reputation abroad and its status at home. However, their assessment of the CIA surplus was strangely muted, as if the attempt to murder a foreign leader was just another form of intellectual failure. In fact, the Cold War coup and assassination were not only mistakes. They are abuse and are still shocked today. For the history of treating these dark events with the right level of anger, a recent work such as Stuart Reid must be looked at Lumumba episode and Hugh Wilford's CIA: Empire History.
In the mid-1970s, thanks to curious news and new confidence conventions, the public began to learn about the CIA’s stranger cause: not only coups and killings, but also about the experiments on mind control (the infamous Mkultra program) and surveillance of American citizens. The result is reform. For example, the law now requires the president to notify Congress before launching a covert operation. Another result is a growing culture of doubt. The revelation of seemingly incapable state of intelligence awakened Americans’ long-term vigilance against spies, which gained cynical, paranoid aspects in the film, e.g. Three Days of Condor This portrays the institution as a sinister shadow government.
Another name of the shadow government is "Shenzhou". At first, President Trump’s conspiracy of intelligence seemed no different from many other baby boomers. Witness his obsession with the assassination of John F. Kennedy. But Trump saw no threat to the country when fostering the ghost of unchecked spy agencies. He saw the threat to himself. He has been a ruthless opponent of the intelligence community since 2016, when he concluded that Russia intervened in that year's presidential election to help his campaign. Trump, who bravely surrendered his spy agencies to his will after his second term, filled the key intelligence work of his administration as Tulsi Gabbard and Kash Patel, who were selected for his unqualified outsiders for being willing to laugh at his false claims about witch hunting.
During the Sanive period, under the leadership of the official, changes to the intelligence community may be welcomed. The CIA never fully restored the trust lost in the 1970s. During the War on Terror, when it uses torture, deduction and drone strikes (in the National Security Agency's mass production plan), its danger reduces the danger that an unacceptable intelligence poses to the national constitutional order. These violations should lead Congress to consider basic reforms to the U.S. spy agencies, including a long-term mission, that they abandoned covert operations and focused on the basic work of foreign intellectual collection and analysis. However, no overhaul was conducted, leaving the CIA and its peers vulnerable to attacks by Trump’s agitators, while Americans were vulnerable to whimsical surveillance status. Now, like most other parts of the federal government, the intelligence community finds itself unconsciously demolished. In April, the president fired the head of the NSA after conspirator Laura Loomer accused him of being unfaithful. In early May, the government announced plans to lay off more than a thousand jobs in the CIA and other spy agencies. The timing is hardly worse. As the United States enters a new era of big-function competition, it urgently needs information about its rivals abroad. But at least in the next few years, U.S. spy agencies will go all out at home with the rogue government.
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